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Abstract Before the advent of sophisticated international financial markets, a widely
accepted belief was that within amonetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating
fiscal transfers between countries is necessary to provide adequate insurance against
country-specific economic fluctuations. A natural question is then: Do sophisticated
international financial markets obviate the need for such an active union-wide author-
ity?We argue that they do. Specifically, we show that in a benchmark economywith no
international financialmarkets, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to achieve
desirable outcomes. With sophisticated international financial markets, however, such
an authority is unnecessary if its only goal is to provide cross-country insurance. Since
restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create
a fiscal externality across them, this result holds in a wide variety of settings. Finally,
we establish that an activist union-wide authority concerned just with providing insur-
ance to member countries is optimal only when individual countries are either unable
or unwilling to pursue desirable policies.
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A monetary union sets union-wide monetary policy in the hope of achieving desirable
outcomes.When amonetary union is established, a classic question arises:How should
the fiscal policies of member countries be coordinated? In particular, is it desirable to
establish a union-wide authority to coordinate the fiscal policies of member countries
as well as to implement international fiscal transfers between them? Amid the recent
debate about the desirability of greater fiscal integration within the European Union,
such a question has regained center stage.
Before the advent of sophisticated international financialmarkets, awidely accepted
belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating fiscal
transfers is desirable to provide adequate insurance against country-specific macro-
economic shocks. In this paper, we examine whether the need for such an authority to
provide cross-country insurance has decreased as international financial markets have
become more developed. In short: Can international financial markets substitute for a
fiscal union?
One view, associated with Mundell (1973), is that sophisticated international finan-
cial markets are sufficient to provide insurance against country-specific economic
fluctuations. Mundell illustrated this point using a simple example in which the world
consists of two islands: Capricorn, which is south of the equator and produces its
crops in the fall, and Cancer, which is north of the equator and produces its crops in the
spring.Both countries are subject to randomfluctuations in their crop output, and goods
can be stored only for six months. Mundell explains how, even with labor immobile
across countries, well-developed insurance markets can achieve the same outcomes
that would be achieved if labor were perfectly mobile and individuals migrated every
six months to the island in which crops can be grown. In short, in Mundell’s view,
international financial markets can provide all the necessary cross-country insurance,
thereby obviating the need for a fiscal union to implement any transfer.
An alternative view, associated with Kenen (1969), is that transfers between regions
of a monetary union are critical to its functioning. Specifically, Kenen argues that in a
currency union, “the domain of fiscal policy ought to coincide with the currency area”
(Kenen 1969, p. 46). In this essay, Kenen also explains how a well-functioning fiscal
union entails large-scale transfers between countries in the face of country-specific
economic fluctuations.
In this paper, we argue that the key difference between Mundell’s and Kenen’s
views of international transfers can be traced back to their distinct ideas of what a
union-wide authority should accomplish. From Mundell’s point of view, the role of
a union-wide authority is simply to provide insurance to member countries, whereas
fromKenen’s point of view, the role of such an authority also entails performing an ex-
ante redistribution of wealth, say, from richer countries to poorer countries in a union.
Our main result is that under Mundell’s view, the advent of sophisticated financial
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markets obviates the need for any such authority to provide international transfers,
whereas under Kenen’s view, such a union-wide authority should play an active role
even in the presence of sophisticated financial markets.
We consider several settings for policy. In our benchmark setting, member coun-
tries’ policies are rich enough that countries can correct all their domestic distortions.
We then investigate a restricted policy setting in which member countries’ policies
are symmetrically constrained in a way that prevents them from resolving all their
domestic distortions. In both settings, we find support for Mundell’s view: if the role
of a union-wide authority is simply to provide insurance and its only instruments are
transfers between countries, then there is still no need for it to play an active role. In
particular, restrictions on member countries’ policies do not create a fiscal externality,
whereby each country adopts a policy that is optimal for that country but is suboptimal
for the union as a whole.
We derive our result under five main assumptions: (i) all countries are small in the
relevant sense, (ii) the union-wide authority andmember countries can commit to their
policies, (iii) the union-wide authority has no advantage over national governments in
its choice of policy instruments, (iv) the government of each country maximizes the
welfare of its citizens, and (v) the union-wide authority maximizes a Pareto-weighted
sum of countries’ utilities, with weights that ensure that the union-wide authority
is only concerned with providing insurance to member countries rather than with
redistributing wealth. If we dispense with any of these assumptions, a role for an
active union-wide authority emerges.
We illustrate this point by analyzing three settings that relax some of these assump-
tions. First, we allow the union-wide authority to have access to instruments that some
of the national governments do not have available. In particular, we envision a more
powerful union-wide authority that, in addition to its ability to impose international
transfers, can levy portfolio taxes on each member country’s international financial
transactions. This expansive viewof a union-wide authority’s powers goeswell beyond
the limited role envisioned for it by Mundell, but is consistent with the role envisioned
for it by Kenen. In this setting, when the policies of member countries are restricted
in various ways, it is typically optimal for the union-wide authority to intervene by
levying portfolio taxes on the countries facing policy restrictions. The rationale for
this intervention, however, is not specifically to improve cross-country insurance, but
rather to help ameliorate domestic distortions in countries that are unable to do so on
their own.
The results from this first setting might lead one to conjecture that the need to
levy portfolio taxes is intimately connected to the restrictions on policy that arise from
countries belonging to amonetary union. Our second setting shows that this conjecture
is incorrect: if national governments face constraints on their policies, then the union-
wide authority typically has an incentive to intervene and impose portfolio taxes even
when countries have flexible exchange rates.
In the settings considered so far, equilibrium outcomes, except for international
transfers, are invariant to whether a given policy is delegated to national governments
or to the union-wide authority. Our third setting is one in which this irrelevance of
delegation of authority result no longer holds. In this case, we allow for self-interested
governments that maximize objective functions that are different from those of their
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citizens.We also allow governments to choose government spending that only benefits
themselves. We think of this environment as capturing the idea that for a whole host of
reasons, including political ones, some governments are unwilling to pursue policies
that are most desirable for their citizens. We show that in this scenario, it is better
to delegate the power to levy portfolio taxes to a union-wide authority rather than to
national governments.
These three settings generate a role for an active union-wide authority. All of them,
however, clearly have a paternalistic flavor: a responsible and powerful union-wide
authority should provide remedial help to member countries, that is, should intervene
only when member countries’ governments are either unable or unwilling to pursue
desirable policies.
In our analysis, we closely follow Farhi and Werning (2013), henceforth FW, by
considering a simple one-period economy with a continuum of countries, each of
which produces traded and nontraded goods. The nontraded goods sector consists of
a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms that produce
differentiated products. The prices of these firms are sticky in that they must be set
before the realization of preference and productivity shocks. The traded goods sector
is competitive and has flexible prices. This economy builds on Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) and is a special case of Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2008).
Even though we purposely adopt the setup of FW in our analysis, we arrive at very
different conclusions. The key difference between our work and that of FW is that we
build in, as part of Mundell’s view, the idea that the goal of a union-wide authority
is simply to provide insurance rather than to redistribute ex-ante wealth, whereas FW
presume that a union-wide authority is also concerned with redistribution over and
above insurance.
Our benchmark fiscal policies grant each government a payroll tax on labor income,
excise taxes on nontraded goods, portfolio taxes, and domestic transfers, whereas
restricted fiscal policies disallow theuseof nontradedgoods taxes.This restriction adds
an extra constraint on each government’s problem, which one might conjecture could
give rise to fiscal externalities. The fiscal union features three tiers of decision makers.
At the top tier, a union-wide authority chooses international transfers between countries
tomaximize aweighted sumof thewelfare of consumers in each country.At themiddle
tier, the governments of all countries, taking as given the international transfers set by
the union-wide authority, noncooperatively choose their countries’ fiscal policies, or
simply national policies, in order to maximize the welfare of the consumers of their
countries. At the bottom tier, consumers and firms in each country, taking as given
both the policies of the union-wide authority and the national governments, make
production and consumption decisions.
We begin by studying the need for a fiscal unionwhen each national government has
access to the benchmark fiscal policies.We start with an incomplete market setting that
captures in a stark way the idea that before the modern era of international financial
markets, cross-country insurance could only be provided through direct cross-country
transfers. As both Mundell and Kenen agree, in such an era there is a clear need for
an active union-wide fiscal authority.
We then consider a setting with complete international financial markets. We think
of this complete market setting as capturing the idea that, in the modern era of sophis-
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ticated international financial markets, countries can rely on these markets to obtain
cross-country insurance. We show that with complete markets, a union-wide fiscal
authority is unnecessary if and only if this authority is concerned solely with pro-
viding insurance to member countries. That is, under Mundell’s view of the role of
a fiscal authority, complete markets ensure that the optimal amount of insurance is
obtained, whereas under Kenen’s view, a fiscal authority is still needed to accomplish
any ex-ante wealth redistribution between member countries.
We then investigate whether, once we restrict the fiscal instruments of national
governments, a fiscal externality arises across countries that necessitates an activist
union-wide authority. That is, we repeat our previous exercise, now with restricted
policies, to determine whether the policies that governments choose to pursue are
inefficient from the viewpoint of the union as a whole. Our key result is that no
fiscal externality arises in this case: even though national governments are unable to
correct all their domestic distortions, they still pursue policies that are optimal for
the union. Thus, even here, we find that a union-wide fiscal authority is unnecessary
with complete markets if and only if this authority is concerned solely with insurance
among countries in the union.
We then turn to identifying circumstances underwhich it is optimal for a union-wide
authority uninterested in redistribution to pursue an activist role in fiscal policy. For
simplicity, we consider a setting in which one group of countries in the union, called
the North, optimally sets traditional fiscal instruments, that is, payroll and nontraded
goods taxes, but the other group, called the South, is unable (or unwilling) to use
nontraded goods taxes. We think of this setup as capturing the idea that the South has
poorly functioning governments. We equip the union-wide authority with portfolio
taxes that it can levy on any country in the union, and show that it is optimal for the
union-wide authority to impose portfolio taxes only on Southern countries. By doing
so, the authority raises the welfare of all countries in the union by partially offsetting
the distortions that the Southern countries are unable to correct on their own.
Of course, if in this setting we allowed countries to have flexible exchange rates,
they could use their domestic monetary policies to offset country-specific shocks, and
there would be no need for an activist union-wide authority. This result may lead one
to think that, more generally, the only reason why the union-wide authority would take
an active role in policy is that countries cannot use their domestic monetary policies
to offset country-specific shocks. To show that this reasoning is incorrect, we consider
a fiscal union with flexible exchange rates but assume that Northern countries have
access only to portfolio taxes, whereas Southern countries again have imperfectly
functioning governments in that they are unable to levy any taxes. The union-wide
authority can levy portfolio taxes on any country in the union.We show that in this case,
the union-wide authority plays an active role by levying portfolio taxes on Southern
countries.As before, though, doing sodoes not correct anymacroeconomic externality;
instead, it simply helps Southern countries ameliorate their domestic distortions.
So far, we have assumed that national governments are benevolent in that they max-
imize the welfare of their citizens. Under this assumption, an irrelevance of delegation
of authority result holds: the equilibrium is unchanged if any of the payroll taxes, non-
traded goods taxes, or portfolio taxes are delegated to the national governments or the
union-wide authority. Our last economy shows that if, instead, national governments
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pursue their own self-interests, then the union as a whole typically has an incentive to
delegate powers, such as portfolio taxes, to a benevolent union-wide authority rather
than to the national governments.
Our analysis implies that even when governments have only restricted fiscal instru-
ments available, no fiscal externalities arise. A key feature of our model behind this
finding is that governments have the power to commit to their fiscal policies once
and for all. By doing so, we abstract from the fiscal externalities that result from lack
of commitment when national fiscal policies are set noncooperatively. These issues
are the focus of the work of Chari and Kehoe (2007, 2008) and have recently been
revisited by Aguiar et al. (2013), who draw the same conclusions as Chari and Kehoe
(2007, 2008) do.
1 A currency-fiscal union with incomplete financial markets
Here we set up a model of a joint currency-fiscal union with incomplete international
financial markets. This model is meant to capture a setting in which international
financial markets cannot provide adequate insurance across countries against country-
specific macroeconomic shocks. For simplicity, we make the extreme assumption that
no international financial markets exist.
Throughout, we distinguish between transfers motivated by insurance reasons and
transfers motivated by redistributive reasons. To this end, we are interested in transfers
that respect private ownership, that is, transfers that are optimal when the union-wide
fiscal authority uses a Pareto weight for each country that, at the appropriately defined
shadow prices, does not involve an ex-ante redistribution of wealth from one country
to another, say, from ex-ante richer countries to ex-ante poorer countries.
The timing of the economy involves three stages,which reflect the three-tiered struc-
ture of decision making discussed earlier. At the first stage, the union-wide authority
moves and sets international transfers. At the second stage, taking as given the deci-
sions of the union-wide authority, national governments set their national fiscal policies
noncooperatively. At the third stage, taking as given the policies set in the previous
stages, consumers and firms in each country make their production and consumption
decisions. It is convenient to both set up and solve for the overall equilibrium, referred
to as the world equilibrium, by working backwards from the end of the period. We
therefore start with the bottom tier.
1.1 Bottom tier: competitive equilibrium
We start by laying out the economy and defining a competitive equilibrium, given the
union-wide and national policies chosen at higher tiers.
The economy lasts one period, features a continuum of countries i ∈ I = [0, 1] that
belong to a currency union, and is adopted from FW. The uncertainty in the economy
is represented by a finite set of states s ∈ S with μ(s) denoting the probability of state
s. This uncertainty affects preferences and technology. Each consumer in country i
has preferences over nontraded goods, CiN (s), traded goods, C
i
T (s), and labor, L
i (s),
given by
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∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s). (1)
Trade of state-contingent assets in domestic asset markets between consumers in coun-
try i takes place before the state s is realized, subject to the asset market constraint
∑
s
Qi (s)Di (s) ≤ 0. (2)
In each state s, a consumer also faces a budget constraint given by
[1 + τ iN (s)]PiNCiN (s) + PT (s)CiT (s) ≤ Wi (s)Li (s)
+PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i (s) + T iI (s)] + i (s) + [1 − τ iD(s)]Di (s). (3)
All prices are expressed in units of a common currency, say, euros. Here Qi (s) is
the price at the beginning of the period for the delivery of one euro in state s, PiN (s)
is the country-specific price of nontraded goods, and PT (s) is the union-wide price
of traded goods. Consumers in country i have endowments of traded goods, Y iT (s),
elastically supply labor, Li (s), to produce nontraded goods at a nominal wage of
Wi (s), and receive nominal profits of i (s) from the ownership of nontraded goods
firms. Consumers take as given the policies of their national governments, namely,
the tax rate on the purchases of nontraded goods in state s, τ iN (s), the tax rate on
domestic assets, τ iD(s), and the domestic transfers, T
i (s), as well as the policies of the
union-wide fiscal authority, namely, the international transfers, T iI (s). Throughout,
domestic and international transfers are in units of traded goods.
The first-order conditions for the consumer’s problem imply that for all states s,
ρi = μ(s)U
i
T (s)[1 − τ iD(s)]
PT (s)Qi (s)
, (4)
UiT (s)
PT (s)
= U
i
N (s)
[1 + τ iN (s)]PiN
, (5)
−U
i
L(s)
UiT (s)
= W
i (s)
PT (s)
, (6)
where ρi is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (2). Here all asset trade is
domestic in that
Di (s) = 0 for all i and s. (7)
In each country i , competitive nontraded final goods firms buy differentiated varieties
of nontraded goods from intermediate producers, combine them into final goods, and
sell them to consumers in country i . These firms solve
max
{Ci, jN (s)}
{
PiNC
i
N (s) −
∫ 1
0
Pi, jN C
i, j
N (s)d j
}
, (8)
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subject to CiN (s) =
[∫ 1
0 C
i, j
N (s)
ε−1
ε d j
] ε
ε−1
, where ε is the elasticity of substitution
among varieties, PiN is the price of the aggregate bundle of goods, and P
i, j
N and
Ci, jN (s) are the price and quantity of variety j in country i at state s. This problem
generates a downward-sloping demand curve for each variety j ,
Ci, jN (s) =
(
Pi, jN
PiN
)−ε
CiN (s). (9)
The intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive and have sticky
prices in that they set their prices before the realization of the state, s. The producer
of variety j in country i produces goods with the technology Ci, jN (s) = Ai (s)Li, j (s)
and charges the price Pi, jN , where L
i, j (s) is the amount of labor employed by this
producer. The profits in state s of such an intermediate goods producer are
i, j (s) = Pi, jN Ci, jN (s) − (1 + τ iL)Wi (s)Li, j (s), (10)
where τ iL is a payroll tax on the labor hired by these firms. The price is chosen to
maximize the value of profits,
max
Pi, jN
⎧
⎨
⎩
∑
s
Qi (s)
[
Pi, jN − (1 + τ iL)
Wi (s)
Ai (s)
](
Pi, jN
PiN
)−ε
CiN (s)
⎫
⎬
⎭ , (11)
where we have substituted the production technology and the demand function in (9)
into the expression for profits in (10). The resulting optimal price is given by
Pi, jN = (1 + τ iL)
ε
ε − 1
∑
s Q
i (s)W
i (s)
Ai (s)
CiN (s)
∑
s Q
i (s)CiN (s)
, (12)
which is a markup over a weighted average of the marginal cost of labor across states.
Notice that the price of each variety j in country i is the same and equal to the right
side of (12) and, thus, so are the choices for output and labor, that is, Pi, jN = Pi, j
′
N ,
Ci, jN (s) = Ci, j
′
N (s), and L
i, j (s) = Li, j ′(s) for all j and j ′. Clearly, the price of each
variety j thus equals the aggregate price index, PiN , the output of each variety equals
the aggregate quantity of nontraded goods,CiN (s), and the labor hired by each producer
j in country i is independent of j and can be written as Li (s).
Consider now the national policies of country i . The policies of country i’s gov-
ernment are summarized by π i = {π i (s)}, where π i (s) = (τ iL , τ iN (s), τ iD(s), T i (s)).
For each s, the government budget constraint requires that domestic transfers equal
domestic tax revenues,
PT (s)T
i (s) = τ iLW i (s)Li (s) + τ iN (s)PiNCiN (s) + τ iD(s)Di (s). (13)
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The government collects revenues from the payroll tax, the tax on the consumption of
nontraded goods, and the portfolio tax, and rebates these revenues to its consumers in
a lump-sum fashion.
The policies of the union-wide authority are international transfers, T iI = {T iI (s)}.
The budget constraint of this authority specifies that international transfers across
countries sum to zero in each state s,
∫
i
T iI (s)di = 0. (14)
Notice that here the union-wide authority transfers resources directly to consumers
rather than to national governments.
Formally, let X = {Xi }, with Xi = {Xi (s)} and Xi (s) = (CiT (s),CiN (s), Li (s),
Di (s)), denote the allocations in country i , P = {Pi }, with Pi = {Pi (s)} and Pi (s) =
(PiN ,W
i (s)), and Q = {Qi }, with Qi = {Qi (s)}, denote the domestic prices in
country i , and π = {π i } denote national policies. Let PT = {PT (s)} denote the world
prices of traded goods, and let TI = {T iI }, with T iI = {T iI (s)}, denote the international
transfers to country i .
Given the policies of the union-wide authority, {T iI }, and the national policies,{π i }, a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets consists of world prices, PT ,
together with allocations, {Xi }, and domestic prices, {Pi } and {Qi }, for each country i
such that: (i) consumer maximization in each country i holds, (ii) profit maximization
for both final goods firms and intermediate goods firms in each country i holds, (iii)
the national policy, π i , satisfies the government budget constraint of each country i ,
(13), (iv) the union-wide policies, {T iI }, satisfy the budget constraint of the union-wide
authority, (14), (v) all asset trade is domestic in the sense that (7) holds, and (vi) the
nontraded goods market-clearing condition holds for each country i ,
CiN (s) = Ai (s)Li (s) for all s, (15)
and the world traded goods market-clearing condition holds,
∫
i
CiT (s)di =
∫
i
Y iT (s)di for all s. (16)
We will show that in an equilibrium with incomplete markets, the conditions above
imply a country i market-clearing condition for traded goods,
CiT (s) = Y iT (s) + T iI (s) for all s. (17)
The following lemma characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented in
such an equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets sat-
isfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions, namely, (15)
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and (16). Moreover, given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can con-
struct prices and policies for each country that, together with the given allocations,
constitute a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Proof : For necessity, by definition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy nontraded
and traded goodsmarket clearing. For sufficiency, given some allocations,we construct
prices, policies, and asset holdings as follows. Clearly, there is one degree of nominal
indeterminacy in the construction of nominal goods prices, whichwe resolve by setting
PT (s0) = 1 for some particular state s0. To see there is also some indeterminacy in
the setting of nontraded goods taxes, τ iN (s), note that (5) implies
UiT (s)/U
i
N (s)
UiT (s0)/U
i
N (s0)
= PT (s)[1 + τ
i
N (s0)]
1 + τ iN (s)
. (18)
We uniquely pin down PT (s) by picking a country, say, i = 0, and setting τ 0N (s) = 0
for all s. Doing so gives
PT (s) = U
0
T (s)/U
0
N (s)
U 0T (s0)/U
0
N (s0)
. (19)
Given PT (s), however, (18) makes clear that for each country i = 0, there is still
one degree of indeterminacy in nontraded goods taxes. To resolve this indeterminacy,
we pick a state, say, s0, and set τ iN (s0) = 0 for all i . Then, using PT (s0) = 1 and
τ iN (s0) = 0 for all i, from (5) we obtain
PiN =
UiN (s0)
UiT (s0)
. (20)
Then, using τ iN (s0) = 0 and (18) gives that the tax on nontraded goods for a country
i = 0 is given by
1 + τ iN (s) =
UiT (s0)/U
i
N (s0)
UiT (s)/U
i
N (s)
PT (s), (21)
and from (6) wages are given by
Wi (s) = −U
i
L(s)
UiT (s)
PT (s),
where PT (s) is given by (19).
There is also one degree of nominal indeterminacy in asset prices. We resolve this
indeterminacy by setting Qi (s0) = 1. There is clearly also a joint indeterminacy
in Qi (s) and τ iD(s). We resolve it by letting Q
i (s) = Q(s) for all i and s, setting
τ 0D(s) = 0 for all s, and τ iD(s0) = 0 for all i = 0. Now, using these normalizations,
we can divide (4) for country 0 evaluated at state s by this same equation for country
0 evaluated at state s0 to obtain
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Q(s) = 1
PT (s)
μ(s)U 0T (s)
μ(s0)U 0T (s0)
, (22)
where PT (s) is given by (19). Now, for i = 0, dividing (4) for states s and s0 and then
using our normalizations and the expression for Q(s) in (22) implies that portfolio
taxes are given by
1 − τ iD(s) =
UiT (s0)
UiT (s)
U 0T (s)
U 0T (s0)
. (23)
Given PiN , W
i (s), and Qi (s), the payroll tax τ iL is set so that (12) holds. Domes-
tic transfers are determined by the government budget constraint, and international
transfers are given by
T iI (s) = CiT (s) − Y iT (s). (24)
To see that such transfers are consistent with the consumer and government budget
constraints, combine these budget constraints and substitute for profits from (10) with
Di (s) = 0 to obtain (24). To see that such transfers are consistent with the union-
wide constraint on international transfers, integrate (24) over countries and use world
market clearing in traded goods, (16), to obtain (14). unionsq
We summarize our normalizations here: we set PT (s0) = 1, τ 0N (s) = 0 for all s,
τ iN (s0) = 0 for all i , Qi (s0) = 1, Qi (s) = Q(s) for all i and s, τ 0D(s) = 0 for all s,
and τ iD(s0) = 0 for all i .
Note that the competitive equilibrium is defined for each possible setting of union-
wide and national policies, (TI , π). As will become clear below, in what follows it
is best to think of the competitive equilibrium as the continuation equilibrium of the
noncooperative equilibrium of the second stage among national governments for given
union-wide policies. That is, we can think of the competitive equilibrium as specifying
allocation functions, X (TI , π), a world price function, PT (TI , π), and domestic price
functions, P(TI , π) and Q(TI , π), that vary with union-wide and national policies,
(TI , π). Noncooperative national governments will use these maps to forecast how
outcomes change as they vary their national policies.
1.2 Middle tier: noncooperative equilibrium between national authorities
Consider now the middle tier. Taking as given the decisions of the union-wide fis-
cal authority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively. The policy for
country i’s government, π i = {π i (s)}, with π i (s) = (τ iL , τ iN (s), τ iD(s), T i (s)), con-
sists of taxes on labor, the consumption of nontraded goods, and asset holdings, and
of transfers. The strategy of country i’s government, π i (TI ), depends on the history
it faces, which, in this three-tiered decision-making structure, simply consists of the
union-wide transfers, TI , chosen at the top tier.
For any given set of union-wide policies, TI = {T iI }, a noncooperative equilibrium
of the incomplete market economy consists of strategiesπ(TI ) = {π i (TI )} for national
governments, together with the world price function, PT (TI , π), and allocation and
domestic price functions for each country, {Xi (TI , π), Pi (TI , π), Qi (TI , π)}, where
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π = {π i }, such that: (i) given the union-wide policies, TI , and the national policies
of every other country j = i , denoted π−i (TI ), the national policy of any country
i , π i = π i (TI ), maximizes the welfare of country i’s consumers, and (ii) for every
(TI , π), the world price function, the allocation functions, and the domestic price
functions form a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets.
The noncooperative equilibrium outcomes associated with these strategies are
π(TˆI ), PT (TˆI , π(TˆI )), and {Xi (TˆI , π(TˆI )), Pi (TˆI , π(TˆI )), Qi (TˆI , π(TˆI ))}, where TˆI
is the optimal policy of the union-wide authority. The noncooperative equilibrium
should be thought of as simply the continuation of the world equilibrium for a given
set of union-wide policies.
Consider the notion of perfection built into this noncooperative equilibrium defini-
tion.As the government of country i contemplates alternative policies, π˜ i , it anticipates
that the resulting prices and allocations, PT (TI , π˜) and {Xi (TI , π˜), Pi (TI , π˜), Qi (TI ,
π˜)}, with π˜ = (π˜ i , π−i (TI )), form a competitive equilibrium. Specifically, given the
structure of the world economy, as the government of country i changes its policies,
consumers and firms in country i change their production and consumption decisions,
domestic prices change but, because country i is small in the world economy, all other
countries’ national policies, allocations, and domestic prices are unchanged. That is,
since the world price of traded goods, PT (TI , π˜), with π˜ = (π˜ i , π−i (TI )), is invariant
to π˜ i , given the union-wide transfers TI , the government of country i just faces a given
world price function, say, PT = PT (TI , π−i (TI )).
We now show how this feature of equilibrium simplifies the problem of country i’s
government. Using logic standard in the primal approach to optimal policy, we can
think of national governments as choosing policies, allocations, and domestic prices
for country i’s consumers and firms, subject to the conditions of the competitive
equilibrium of the third stage. Formally, the problem of the government of country i
can be written as follows: taking as given international transfers, T iI , and traded goods
prices, PT = PT (TI , π−i (TI )), choose country i’s allocations, prices, and policies to
solve
V i (T iI ) = max{Xi (s),Pi (s),Qi (s),π i (s)}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s), (25)
subject to consumer and firm first-order conditions in country i , the consumer and gov-
ernment budget constraints in country i , and country i’s market-clearing conditions in
nontraded (15) and traded goods (17), where PT = PT (TI , π−i (TI )) in the consumer
and government budget constraints.1 We claim that the best-response problem of a
noncooperative government can be reduced to a simpler form, that is,
V i (T iI ) = max{
CiN (s),C
i
T (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s), (26)
1 Here, and throughout the paper, we follow the primal approach in assuming that if there are multiple
equilibria associated with its policies, a government can select the best one.
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subject to nontraded goods market clearing,
CiN (s) ≤ Ai (s)Li (s) for all s, (27)
and a country-wide budget constraint,
CiT (s) ≤ Y iT (s) + T iI (s) for all s. (28)
Note that since there are no international financial markets, the government of country
i realizes that there is no choice in the consumption of traded goods: consumers
in country i simply consume their endowment plus international transfers of traded
goods.
Lemma 2 In an economy with incomplete markets, for any international transfers,
TI , and strategies of other governments, π−i (TI ), the best response of the government
of country i gives rise to allocations that solve (26).
Proof : The constraints facing the government of country i are summarized by the
consumer budget constraint, (3), the first-order conditions for consumers, (4), (5), and
(6), the market-clearing condition for domestic assets, (7), the first-order condition for
nontraded goods firms, (12), the government budget constraint, (13), and the nontraded
and traded goods market-clearing conditions, (15) and (17).
We first show that an allocation that is feasible for the government must satisfy
(27) and (28) for country i . First, (15) is the same as (27), since (27) holds as an
equality. Second, to see how the constraint (28) arises, substitute in the consumer
budget constraint the expression for profits,i (s) = PiNCiN (s)−(1+τ iL)Wi (s)Li (s),
the expression for domestic transfers, T i (s), using the government budget constraint,
(13), and Di (s) = 0 from (7). After canceling terms, we obtain PT (s)CiT (s) ≤
PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T iI (s)], which is equivalent to (28). Now, given any allocations that
satisfy (27) and (28), we can construct national policies and national prices as we did
in Lemma 1 so that the rest of the constraints are satisfied. unionsq
To develop some intuition for why a noncooperative government’s problem can be
reduced to a country-specific Ramsey-type problem, note that each country i is small
and, hence, the domestic allocations, prices, and policies chosen by the government
of this country cannot have an impact on world prices. Moreover, the policy choices
of the countries in the rest of the union only affect a given country indirectly through
traded goods prices, which are set competitively.
Lemma 2 makes it clear that, given the vector of international transfers for each
country, {T iI }, world prices, PT , and the maximizing behavior of the government of
country i , the resulting utility of country i only depends on the international transfers to
country i . Thus, Lemma 2 establishes the precise sense in which no fiscal externalities
across countries exist.
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1.3 Top tier: world equilibrium
The union-wide authority chooses international transfers to maximize a weighted sum
of consumers’ utility in each country, that is, to solve
max{
T iI
}
∫
i
λi V i (T iI )di (29)
subject to ∫
i
T iI (s)di = 0 for all s. (30)
Notice that the union-wide authority predicts that as it changes its transfers, the non-
cooperative governments will alter their policies, and thus the associated prices and
allocations, so that the solution to (26) arises as a noncooperative equilibrium. In par-
ticular, for every set of transfers T˜I it contemplates, the union-wide authority predicts
that the national governments will choose policies π(T˜I ) consistent with a noncoop-
erative equilibrium.
A world equilibrium with incomplete markets is a set of union-wide transfers,
TI , strategies for national governments, together with the world price function, and
allocation and domestic price functions for each country, such that: (i) the union-
wide transfers, TI , are optimal for the union-wide authority, and (ii) the strategies for
national governments, together with the world price function, allocation functions,
and domestic price functions for each country, form a noncooperative equilibrium.
This notion also has a type of perfection built into it: as the union-wide authority
contemplates alternative transfers, T˜I , it understands that national governments will
best respond to each such set of transfers using π(T˜I ) and the resulting competitive
equilibrium allocations and prices will be those consistent with T˜I and π(T˜I ).
Using standard primal logic, we can think of the union-wide authority as choos-
ing all policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions.2 The first
set are all the first-order conditions of consumers and firms, the budget constraints
of consumers and governments, and the market-clearing conditions that define the
competitive equilibrium. The second set are the optimality conditions for the poli-
cies of each government’s best-response problem. Notice that since the consumption
of traded goods is pinned down by the endowment of traded goods and international
transfers, the only optimality conditions from the government’s best-response problem
are for nontraded goods and labor. Substituting the constraints (27) and (28), holding
as equalities, into the objective function (26), these first-order conditions for nontraded
goods and labor reduce to
Ai (s)UiN (s) + UiL(s) = 0. (31)
2 Here, as is standard in the primal approach, if there are multiple continuation equilibria for a given set of
policies, we implicitly let both the union-wide authority and the national governments select the best such
equilibrium.
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If allocations satisfy (28) and the union-wide authority chooses international trans-
fers that satisfy (30), then the union-wide authority is only constrained by the nontraded
and world traded goods market-clearing conditions, along with the first-order condi-
tions in (31). Now consider a relaxed version of the authority’s problem, where we
substitute out all the policies and drop the first-order condition (31), which arises from
(26). This relaxed problem, referred to as the union-wide problem, is
max{
CiN (s),C
i
T (s),L
i (s)
}
∫
i
λi
[
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s)
]
di (32)
subject to
CiN (s) ≤ Ai (s)Li (s) for all s, (33)∫
i
CiT (s)di ≤
∫
i
Y iT (s)di for all s. (34)
We claim that it is immediate that the solution to this relaxed problem has first-
order conditions that are consistent with the dropped first-order condition (31) of the
government’s best-response problem.Moreover, policies and prices can be constructed
so that a solution to this relaxed problem satisfies the rest of the dropped constraints
of the original problem. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem coincides with the
solution to the original problem. We summarize this discussion as follows.
Lemma 3 The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets solve
the union-wide problem (32).
2 A currency-fiscal union with complete financial markets
Here we consider a joint currency-fiscal union with complete international financial
markets. We think of this complete market setting as capturing the idea that in the
modern era of international financial markets, countries can access these markets to
obtain cross-country insurance. We again work backwards from the end of the period,
starting from the competitive equilibrium.
2.1 Bottom tier: competitive equilibrium
We begin with a definition of a competitive equilibrium. Given the policies of the
union-wide authority, {T iI }, and the national policies, {π i }, a competitive equilibrium
with complete markets consists of world prices, PT and Q, together with allocations,
{Xi }, and domestic prices, {Pi }, for each country i such that: (i) consumer maximiza-
tion in each country i holds, (ii) profit maximization for both final goods firms and
intermediate goods firms in each country i holds, (iii) the national policy, π i , satisfies
the government budget constraint of each country i , (13), (iv) the union-wide policies,
{T iI }, satisfy the budget constraint of the union-wide authority, (14), (v) the world asset
market clears in that
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∫
i
Di (s)di = 0 for all s, (35)
and (vi) the nontraded and world traded goods markets clear in that
CiN (s) = Ai (s)Li (s) for all i and s, (36)∫
i
CiT (s)di =
∫
i
Y iT (s)di for all s. (37)
Note that with complete markets, there is now one world asset market rather than
separate domestic asset markets. Given complete markets, any vector of international
transfers to country i , namely, T iI = {T iI (s)}, with the same present value is equivalent
from the perspective of both the consumers and the government of country i . Thus, in
defining a world equilibrium, there will be an indeterminacy in international transfers
because any two sets of transfers, {T iI (s)} and {T˜ iI (s)}, are equivalent if they satisfy
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)T
i
I (s) =
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)T˜
i
I (s),
for given Q(s) and PT (s). We resolve this indeterminacy by representing interna-
tional transfers as a constant transfer across states, T i,cI , such that T
i
I (s) = T i,cI for
all s. Here, as earlier, we can think of equilibrium as specifying allocation functions,
X (T cI , π), world price functions, PT (T
c
I , π) and Q(T
c
I , π), and domestic price func-
tions, P(T cI , π), that vary with union-wide and national policies, (T
c
I , π). The proof
of the following lemma is nearly identical to that of Lemma 1 and is left to the reader.
Lemma 4 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets satisfy
the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions, namely, (36) and
(37). Moreover, given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct
prices, policies, and asset holdings for each country that, together with the given
allocations, constitute a competitive equilibrium with complete markets.
2.2 Middle tier: noncooperative equilibrium between national authorities
Consider now the middle tier. As before, taking as given the decisions of the union-
wide authority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively. For any given
set of union-wide policies, T cI = {T i,cI }, a noncooperative equilibrium of the complete
market economy consists of strategies π(T cI ) = {π i (T cI )} for national governments,
together with world price functions, PT (T cI , π) and Q(T
c
I , π), and allocation and
domestic price functions for each country, {Xi (T cI , π), Pi (T cI , π)}, where π = {π i },
such that: (i) given the union-wide policies, T cI , and the national policies of every other
country j = i , denoted π−i (T cI ), the national policy of any country i , π i = π i (T cI ),
maximizes the welfare of country i’s consumers, and (ii) for every (T cI , π), the world
price functions, the allocation functions, and the domestic price functions form a
competitive equilibrium with complete markets.
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Using logic similar to that used before, the best response of a noncooperative
government can be reduced to a simpler form, that is,
V i (T i,cI ) = max{
CiN (s),C
i
T (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s), (38)
subject to nontraded goods market clearing,
CiN (s) ≤ Ai (s)Li (s) for all s, (39)
and a country-wide budget constraint,
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) ≤
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i,cI ], (40)
where PT = PT (T cI , π−i (T cI )) and Q = Q(T cI , π−i (T cI )). Here, as earlier, we use the
property that world prices do not vary with the policies of country i .
Lemma 5 In an economy with complete markets, for any international transfers, T cI ,
and strategies of other governments, π−i (T cI ), the best response of the government of
country i gives rise to allocations that solve (38).
Proof : The proof follows closely that of Lemma 2 with a few exceptions. The con-
straints facing the government of country i are the same as in Lemma 2 except
that the asset market-clearing condition (7) is replaced by (35). To see that a
feasible allocation for the government must satisfy the country-wide budget con-
straint (40), substitute in the consumer budget constraint the expression for profits,
i (s) = PiNCiN (s) − (1 + τ iL)Wi (s)Li (s), the expression for domestic transfers,
T i (s), from the government budget constraint, (13), and cancel terms, to obtain
PT (s)CiT (s) ≤ PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i,cI ] + Di (s). Then, multiply this constraint for each
s by the world asset price Q(s), sum across states, and use the asset market constraint
(2) to arrive at (40).
Now, given any allocations that satisfy (39) and (40), we can construct national
policies and national prices so that the rest of the constraints are satisfied. Here country
i takes as given the world prices, Q(s) and PT (s). Given these prices, we proceed as
in Lemma 1, by using the normalizations τ iD(s0) = 0, Q(s0) = 1, and PT (s0) = 1 so
that (4) implies
1 − τ iD(s) =
μ(s0)
μ(s)
UiT (s0)
UiT (s)
Q(s)PT (s) (41)
and let (41) determine τ iD(s). (In contrast to Lemma 1, where we also constructed
world prices, here we only characterize the best response of a government given these
prices.) The rest of the argument follows analogously to those in Lemmas 1 and 2. unionsq
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2.3 Top tier: world equilibrium
Aworld equilibrium with complete markets is a set of union-wide transfers, T cI , strate-
gies for national governments, together with world price functions, and allocation and
domestic price functions for each country, such that: (i) the union-wide transfers, T cI ,
are optimal for the union-wide authority, and (ii) the strategies for national govern-
ments, together with the world price functions, allocation functions, and domestic
price functions for each country, form a noncooperative equilibrium.
As before, using standard primal logic, the union-wide authority can be thought of
as choosing all the policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions.
The first set are all the first-order conditions of consumers and firms, the budget
constraints of consumers and governments, and the market-clearing conditions that
define the competitive equilibrium of the third stage. The second set are the optimality
conditions for the policies of each government’s best-response problem. Now consider
a relaxed version of this authority’s problem, where we substituted out all the policies
and dropped the first-order conditions of national governments that arise from the
rewritten government’s problem (38). This relaxed problem has the form
max{
CiN (s),C
i
T (s),L
i (s)
}
∫
i
λi
[
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s)
]
di (42)
subject to
CiN (s) ≤ Ai (s)Li (s) and
∫
i
CiT (s)di ≤
∫
i
Y iT (s)di for all s.
Clearly, we can construct prices Q(s) and PT (s) and international transfers so that the
solution to this relaxed problem has first-order conditions that are consistent with the
first-order conditions of each government’s best-response problem in (38). Moreover,
these prices and policies can be constructed so that a solution to the relaxed problem
satisfies the rest of the dropped constraints of the original problem. Thus, the solution
to the relaxed problem is a solution to the original problem. In sum,we have established
the following result.
Lemma 6 The allocations in the world equilibrium with complete markets solve the
union-wide problem (42).
Note that the union-wide problem with complete markets coincides with that with
incomplete markets. The intuition is that with incomplete markets, appropriately
chosen union-wide transfers exactly mimic the risk-sharing payments made under
complete markets. Moreover, in the world equilibrium with complete markets that
decentralizes the corresponding allocations, portfolio taxes are not used. To see why,
note that the solution to the union-wide problem implies complete risk sharing in that
λiU iT (s) = λ0U 0T (s) for all i and s. (43)
123
Fiscal unions redux
Dividing this condition by its analog in state s0 gives that allocations with complete
risk sharing satisfy
UiT (s)
UiT (s0)
= U
0
T (s)
U 0T (s0)
for all i and s. (44)
Now, consider the decentralized equilibrium. With complete international financial
markets, which imply Qi (s) = Q(s) for all i , the first-order condition (4) implies that
[1 − τ iD(s)]μ(s)UiT (s)
[1 − τ iD(s0)]μ(s0)UiT (s0)
= [1 − τ
0
D(s)]μ(s)U 0T (s)
[1 − τ 0D(s0)]μ(s0)U 0T (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s), (45)
where we have used the normalizations that Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1. Clearly, the alloca-
tions that satisfy (44) can be supported as competitive allocations with τ iD(s) = 0 for
all i and s. In this sense, portfolio taxes are redundant given nontraded goods taxes.
More generally, if we dropped the portfolio tax from the list of instruments a
government controls, thenwewould obtain the same results aswe did earlier, including
Lemmas 3 and 6. To see why, consider first the economy with complete markets
and note that if we endow governments only with a payroll tax and a nontraded
goods tax, then the allocations that solve the best-response problem for noncooperative
governments would also solve (38). To understand this result, note that with τ iD(s) = 0
for all i and s, dividing the first-order condition (4) in a given country i for state s by the
corresponding one for state s0 gives that allocations must satisfy the extra constraint
μ(s)UiT (s)
μ(s0)UiT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s) for all s = s0. (46)
This constraint would then need to be added to the best-response problem (38). To
see that this extra constraint is superfluous, consider a relaxed version of this problem
without the constraint in (46). The first-order conditions to the relaxed problem then
imply (46), so the solution to the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem
with this constraint and hence solves it. It is thus immediate that the union-wide
problem is unchanged. A similar argument holds with incomplete markets. Portfolio
taxes are not used in Lemma 2, so Lemma 3 would also hold without portfolio taxes.
Then, the union-wide problem with incomplete markets would be unchanged if we
dropped portfolio taxes.
3 Do financial markets obviate the need for a fiscal union?
We have argued that the key difference between Mundell’s and Kenen’s views of a
union is that Mundell envisions a union in which international transfers are motivated
solely by insurance reasons, whereas Kenen imagines a union in which these transfers
are motivated by redistributive reasons as well. To formalize these different views, we
need to distinguish clearly a union’s goal of providing insurance to member countries
from its goal of redistributing ex-ante wealth.
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Given our setupwith self-interested consumers and governments acting on behalf of
their own citizens, obviously no government will willingly give away ex-ante wealth.
Hence, regardless of how sophisticated international financial markets are, if the goal
of a union is to redistribute ex-ante wealth, a union-wide authority is needed to extract
ex-ante resources from one group of countries and redistribute them to another. That
is, under Kenen’s view, an activist union-wide authority is necessary to implement
such a redistribution.
We claim that the key difference between Mundell’s and Kenen’s views of a union
amounts to different specifications of the Pareto weights used by the union-wide
authority when deciding on international transfers. Specifically, for an arbitrary set
of welfare weights, λ = {λi }, a union-wide authority both provides insurance and
redistributes ex-ante wealth. To focus on insurance only, we proceed as follows. For
any given set of weights, we construct our decentralization of the allocations from the
union-wide problem in the incomplete market equilibrium, (32), as in Lemma 1, with
artificial prices Q(s; λ) and PT (s; λ) and associated consumption levels {CiT (s; λ)}.
The international transfers that decentralize this problem are defined by
T iI (s; λ) = Y iT (s) − CiT (s; λ), (47)
that is, T iI (s; λ) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when
the union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights λ. Under the decentralization of this
problem, these transfers have an ex-ante value of
WiI (λ) =
∑
s
Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ)T iI (s; λ). (48)
We say that the weights λ involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between countries if
WiI (λ) = 0 for all i ∈ I. (49)
We say that a union-wide fiscal authority is concerned solelywith insurance if its objec-
tive function has Pareto weights that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between
countries, and has redistributive motives otherwise.
In short, according to Mundell’s view, in the incomplete markets era, the union-
wide authority has weights that satisfy (49). Given these weights, we then address
Mundell’s question: In the modern era of complete markets, is there any role for an
activist union-wide policy of transfers? More precisely, we say that the union-wide
fiscal authority is unnecessary with complete markets if the allocations in the world
equilibrium in which this authority implements international transfers coincide with
those in the world equilibrium in which all international transfers are restricted to zero.
That is, letting T i,cI (λ) denote the equilibrium transfers under complete markets, the
union-wide authority is unnecessary if T i,cI (λ) = 0 for all i . The following is our first
main proposition.
Proposition 1 (CompleteMarkets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union)A union-wide
fiscal authority is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is
concerned solely with insurance.
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Proof : Recall that the problem of the union-wide authority with incomplete markets
reduces to the same problem as it does with complete markets. Accordingly, we start
with the allocations that a union-wide authority would choose to implement with a
system of international transfers when markets are incomplete. We then show that
these same allocations would arise in an equilibrium with complete markets with
no intervention by the union-wide authority, as long as the union-wide authority is
concerned solely with insurance.
The problem of the union-wide authority with incomplete markets reduces to the
one in (32). Let {CiT (s; λ)} and Q(s; λ) denote the traded goods allocations and the
artificial prices for this problem. The first-order conditions imply perfect risk sharing
in that
λiU iT (s; λ) = λ0U 0T (s; λ) for all i and s, (50)
which yield
UiT (s; λ)
UiT (s0; λ)
= U
0
T (s; λ)
U 0T (s0; λ)
for all i and s. (51)
Using the decentralization in Lemma 1, we obtain
PT (s; λ) = U
0
T (s; λ)/U 0N (s; λ)
U 0T (s0; λ)/U 0N (s0; λ)
and Q(s; λ) = 1
PT (s; λ)
μ(s)UiT (s; λ)
μ(s0)UiT (s0; λ)
,
(52)
where (51) and (52) imply that Q(s; λ) does not vary with the country i . The transfers
are
T iI (s; λ) = Y iT (s) − CiT (s; λ), (53)
that is, T iI (s; λ) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when
the union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights λ. These transfers involve no ex-ante
transfer of wealth between countries if
WiI (λ) =
∑
s
Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ)T iI (s; λ) = 0 for all i. (54)
Now consider the problem of the union-wide authority with complete markets. As
we have argued, that problem reduces to (42) and thus its solution implies the same
allocations {CiT (s; λ)} as those implied by the problem in (32). We can decentralize
these allocations as we did in Lemma 4. Clearly, the prices that decentralize these
allocations as a complete market equilibrium equal the prices that decentralize them as
an incomplete market equilibrium. The state-uncontingent transfers T i,cI (λ) under the
complete market decentralization are related to the state-contingent transfers T iI (s; λ)
under the incomplete market decentralization by
T i,cI (λ)
∑
s
Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ) =
∑
s
Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ)T iI (s; λ). (55)
Thus, for the weights λ that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth under incomplete
markets, namely, those that satisfy (49), the complete market transfers necessarily
satisfy
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T i,cI (λ) = 0 for all i. (56)
Hence, (56) establishes that a union-wide fiscal authority is unnecessarywith complete
markets if and only if this authority is concerned solely with insurance. unionsq
4 Do restrictions on policies generate fiscal externalities?
So far we have considered economies in which national governments have available
rich enough fiscal instruments that the distortions associated with monopoly power,
sticky prices, and a fixed exchange rate can be eliminated by a suitable choice of
policies. Thus, with such instruments and completemarkets, each national government
can maximize its citizens’ welfare subject only to a country-wide budget constraint
and the nontraded goods resource constraint.
Here we consider economies in which national governments have a restricted set
of fiscal instruments available so that they cannot eliminate all private distortions. The
question we address is the following: Does restricting the set of fiscal instruments
of national governments introduce a fiscal externality across countries? That is, with
restricted policy instruments, is a union-wide fiscal authority necessary to achieve
the relevant constrained-efficient outcomes? Our answer is no: even with restricted
instruments, no fiscal externality arises and, thus, a union-wide fiscal authority is
unnecessary if the authority is concerned solely with insurance.
4.1 Restrictions on policies
Here we restrict governments to have no domestic policy instrument that affects the
relative prices of traded and nontraded goods, that is, we make the restricted policy
assumption that
τ iN (s) = 0 for all i and s. (57)
We again proceed by working backwards from the end of the period. To characterize
the set of allocations that can be implemented by a suitable choice of policy, consider
the first-order conditions of consumers in (4)-(6) and the intermediate goods firms in
(12) under the restricted policy assumption. We claim that in addition to the resource
constraints, these allocations must satisfy some additional constraints that we refer to
as incomplete tax constraints. To see how these constraints arise, note that with τ iN (s)
restricted to zero and the normalization that PT (s0) = 1, the first-order condition (5)
implies
UiT (s)/U
i
N (s)
UiT (s0)/U
i
N (s0)
= PT (s), (58)
where the right side does not vary across countries.3 Thus, the left side of (58) must be
the same across all countries i for any given state s. Letting Ri (s) ≡ UiT (s)/UiN (s),
3 Of course, if exchange rates were flexible so that each country had its own nominal price of traded goods,
PiT (s), then even with τ
i
N (s) restricted to zero, the right side of this first-order condition would vary with i
and there would be no such restriction.
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we can compactly express these constraints relative to some particular country, say,
i = 0, as
Ri (s)
Ri (s0)
= R
0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i and s. (59)
Hence, for each country i = 0, there is one constraint per state s = s0. Here we
discuss how these incomplete tax constraints change the analysis in the incomplete
and complete market economies.
4.2 Incomplete markets with restricted policies
We again proceed with each tier. A competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets
and restricted policies is defined analogously to that of our economy with unrestricted
instruments. The lemma characterizing the competitive equilibrium is the analog of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 7 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets and
restricted policies satisfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing con-
ditions, namely, (15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Moreover,
given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices and poli-
cies for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute a competitive
equilibrium with incomplete markets and restricted policies.
Proof : For necessity, by definition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy the non-
traded and world traded goods market-clearing conditions. To see that they must also
satisfy the incomplete tax constraints, divide each term in (5) for some state s by its
counterpart in state s′, imposing τ iN (s) = τ iN (s′) = 0 to get
Ri (s)
Ri (s′)
= PT (s)
PT (s′)
. (60)
To see that (60) implies (59), pick state s′ to be state s0 and divide (60) for country i by
the same constraint for country 0. This yields (59). For sufficiency, the construction
follows the same steps as in Lemma 1. unionsq
As for the middle tier, given the policies of the union-wide authority, TI = {T iI },
a noncooperative equilibrium of the incomplete market economy is defined as before
except that the domestic price functions form a competitive equilibrium with incom-
plete markets and restricted policies. We claim that it is immediate from Lemma 7 and
the definition of the noncooperative equilibrium that the best response of country i’s
government implies allocations that solve
V i (T iI ) = max{
CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (Ai (s)Li (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s), (61)
subject to a country-wide budget constraint,
CiT (s) ≤ Y iT (s) + T iI (s) for all s, (62)
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and the incomplete tax constraints,
Ri (s) = PT (s)Ri (s0) for s = s0, (63)
which follows from (58), with PT (s0) = 1 and PT = PT (TI , π−i (TI )). The reason a
government’s best response solves this problem is that, taking as given the union-wide
policy {T iI } and the strategiesπ−i (TI )of other governments, the government of country
i can manipulate its national policies to implement any allocation that satisfies (62)
and (63). Notice that with restricted instruments, the constraints in (63) imply that we
can no longer reduce this best-response problem to one in which all the traded goods
prices have been substituted out, as we did earlier with unrestricted instruments. The
presence of these extra constraints, (63), clearly introduces additional distortions into
this problem relative to the one with an unrestricted tax system. Here, the incomplete
tax constraints typically bind when countries face different shocks. Hence, the analog
of Lemma 3 is immediate.
Lemma 8 The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets and
restricted policies solve the union-wide problem of maximizing the objective function
in (32), subject to the resource constraints for nontraded goods, the world resource
constraints for traded goods, and the incomplete tax constraints in (59).
For any given set of weights λ = {λi }, for the proof of this lemma we construct
our decentralization of the solution to the union-wide problem for the incomplete
market economywith restricted instruments as in Lemma 1, with prices {Qi (s; λ)} and
associated consumption levels {CiT (s; λ)}. The international transfers that decentralize
this problem satisfy (47).
4.3 Complete markets with restricted policies
The analysis here is an immediate extension of our analysis above. The key lemma
for the competitive equilibrium is the analog of Lemma 7.
Lemma 9 The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and
restricted policies satisfy the nontraded and world traded goods market-clearing con-
ditions, namely, (15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Moreover,
given any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices, policies,
and asset holdings for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute
a competitive equilibrium with complete markets and restricted policies.
Given the world prices PT and Q and the (state-uncontingent) international trans-
fers T i,cI , the problem of the noncooperative government of country i is to choose
allocations to maximize the welfare of country i , that is,
max{
CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (Ai (s)Li (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s)
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subject to
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) ≤
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i,cI ],
Ri (s) = PT (s)Ri (s0) all s = s0,
where PT and Q are defined as functions of (T cI , π−i (T
c
I )) and are part of a competitive
equilibrium with complete markets and restricted policies. The problem of the union-
wide authority is defined as before. The definitions of a union-wide authority being
concerned solely with insurance, having redistributivemotives, and being unnecessary
with complete markets are the natural analogs of those introduced earlier for the
economy with no restrictions on instruments. The second main result of the paper is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Complete Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union Even with
Restricted Policies) In an economy with restricted policies, a union-wide fiscal author-
ity is unnecessarywith completemarkets if and only if this authority is concerned solely
with insurance.
Proof : The proof is essentially identical to that of Proposition 1. The union-wide
authority’s problems under incomplete and complete markets reduce to the same
planning problem, namely, to maximize the objective function of the union subject
to the resource constraints for nontraded goods (33), the world resource constraints
for traded goods (34), and the incomplete tax constraints (59). Using the decentraliza-
tions of Lemmas 7, 8, and 9, if the weights that decentralize the incomplete market
allocations imply international transfers {T iI (s; λ)} that involve no ex-ante transfer of
wealth in that
∑
s Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ)T iI (s; λ) = 0, then clearly for those same weights,
the complete market transfers, {T i,cI (λ)}, that decentralize these same outcomes nec-
essarily satisfy T i,cI (λ)
∑
s Q(s; λ)PT (s; λ) = 0 for all i , so that T i,cI (λ) = 0 for all i .unionsq
5 When is there a role for an activist union-wide authority?
We have shown that for the economies considered, there is no role for an activist
union-wide authority under complete markets when that authority is concerned solely
with insurance. Here we determine conditions under which there might be a role for
such an authority.
Our results so far depend on the premise that the union-wide authority has no
access to instruments that national governments do not have available, except for
international transfers, and that the national government of each country is benevolent
in that it chooses policies to maximize the welfare of its citizens. It is primarily the
combination of these two assumptions, along with the assumption that policy makers
have commitment and that each country is small in the world in the relevant sense,
which allows us to establish this result. If we drop any of these assumptions, there
may be a role for a union-wide authority, even one concerned solely with insurance.
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We prove this point through three examples. Our first example shows that if some
countries are constrained in their choice of policy instruments, then there is a role
for an active union-wide authority to levy portfolio taxes. Our second example shows
that even when countries have flexible exchange rates, if national governments face
constraints on their policies, then the union-wide authority typically has an incentive
to intervene and impose portfolio taxes. Finally, our last example shows that if national
governments do not maximize the welfare of their citizens but rather pursue their own
self-interests, then there is an incentive for the union as awhole to delegate the power to
set portfolio taxes to the union-wide authority rather than to the national governments.
5.1 Portfolio taxes to help policy-constrained countries in a union
Suppose that all countries in onegroupof the union, N or theNorth, have access to labor
taxes, nontraded goods taxes, and lump-sum transfers, {τ iL , τ iN (s), T i (s)} for i ∈ N ,
but that countries in another group, S or the South, have access only to labor taxes and
lump-sum transfers, {τ iL , T i (s)} for i ∈ S. Suppose, moreover, that the union-wide
authority, rather than national governments, can levy taxes on the portfolios of all
countries in the union, {τ iD(s)} for all i , and when it levies such taxes on a country, it
rebates the proceeds to that country.
Clearly, the restrictions on the fiscal instruments of Southern countries add incom-
plete tax constraints of the form
Ri (s)
Ri (s0)
= R
0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i ∈ S and s = s0, (64)
where country 0 is a Southern country. Now, given that the union-wide authority can
levy portfolio taxes {τ iD(s)} on any country, it is easy to show that the problem of the
union-wide authority reduces to
max{
CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∫
i
λi
[
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (Ai (s)Li (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s)
]
di, (65)
subject to the incomplete tax constraints for the Southern countries in (64) and the
world resource constraints for traded goods. Now consider two pairs of countries,
countries i, j ∈ N and k, l ∈ S. The first-order conditions of consumers imply that
for all s
λiU iT (s) = λ jU jT (s) = λkUkT (s) + φk(s) = λlUlT (s) + φl(s), (66)
where for m = k, l, m = 0, and s = s0,
φm(s) = −λm [Am(s)UmN (s) + UmL (s)
] ∂Rm(s)/∂CmT (s)
∂Rm(s)/∂Lm(s)
. (67)
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As we show in the Appendix, the expressions for φm(s) for m = 0 and s = s0, and
those for m = 0 are similar. The first-order condition (66) implies that there is perfect
risk sharing between any two Northern countries but, because of the incomplete tax
constraints, there is imperfect risk sharing either between a Northern country and
a Southern country or between any two Southern countries. To achieve allocations
consistent with (66), the union levies the following portfolio taxes:
τ iD(s) =
{
0 for i ∈ N
− 1
λi
φi (s)
UiT (s)
for i ∈ S . (68)
To see why, note that in the decentralized equilibrium with complete markets, the
first-order conditions for consumers imply
UiT (s)[1 − τ iD(s)]
ρi
= U
0
T (s)[1 − τ 0D(s)]
ρ0
, (69)
where ρi is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (2). Here with τ iD(s) defined
by (68) and the multiplier ρi set to 1/λi , the decentralized first-order conditions (69)
coincide with those in the union-wide problem, (66).
Proposition 3A (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries) In this econ-
omy with restricted policies, a union-wide fiscal authority concerned solely with
insurance makes no transfers to any country and levies portfolio taxes on policy-
restricted countries solely to help these countries ameliorate their distortions.
Here the union-wide authority simply helps policy-restricted countries by levying
a portfolio tax, which is less powerful than the nontraded goods tax in that it only
partially fixes the limited risk sharing implied by the incomplete tax system. The
union-wide authority levies such a tax only because a policy-restricted country is
incapable of levying a nontraded goods tax for itself that would undo the incomplete
tax constraint.
Notice that here an active role for the union-wide authority is intimately connected
to the countries belonging to a monetary union. To see why, suppose that countries
still belong to a fiscal union, but that exchange rates between member countries of the
union are flexible. In this case, each country i has its own nominal price PiT (s) for its
traded goods, where PiT (s) is the price of traded goods in the local currency of country
i in state s. For this economy with flexible exchange rates, note that even if τ iN (s) is
restricted to zero, the first-order condition (5) implies
Ri (s)
Ri (s0)
= U
i
T (s)/U
i
N (s)
UiT (s0)/U
i
N (s0)
= PiT (s), (70)
where we have used the normalization PiT (s0) = 1. But now the right side of (70)
varies with i so that there are no incomplete tax constraints: allocations can be con-
structed ignoring this constraint, and then PiT (s) can be chosen so that (70) holds. We
summarize this discussion with a proposition.
123
P. J. Kehoe, E. Pastorino
Proposition 3B (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries Unnecessary
with Flexible Exchange Rates) In this economy with restricted policies and flexible
exchange rates, a union-wide fiscal authority concerned solely with insurance neither
makes transfers nor levies portfolio taxes.
This result implies that once we allow for flexible exchange rates, there is no need to
levy portfolio taxes. Propositions 3A and 3B might lead one to conjecture that, more
generally, portfolio taxes are necessary only when countries belong to a monetary
union and that these taxes offset cross-country externalities. We show in the next
section that this conjecture is incorrect.
5.2 Portfolio taxes without a monetary union
Here we consider a fiscal union with flexible exchange rates and severe restrictions on
the policies of national governments. Specifically, no countries have access to a payroll
tax on labor or nontraded goods taxes, the Northern countries have access to portfolio
taxes, whereas Southern countries do not. The union-wide authority, however, has the
ability to levy portfolio taxes on any country i it chooses. To make our point even
starker, imagine that the price of nontraded goods is flexible rather than sticky.
Here the lack of a payroll tax means that a country no longer has an instrument to
offset the monopoly distortion in the labor market. Thus, since nontraded goods prices
are flexible, the price setting rule (12) reduces to
PiN (s) =
ε
ε − 1
Wi (s)
Ai (s)
, (71)
which adds an extra constraint to the national governments’ problems. In particular,
using the consumer first-order condition
−U
i
L(s)
UiN (s)
= W
i (s)
PiN (s)
,
we can rewrite (71) as
− U
i
L(s)
UiN (s)
= ε − 1
ε
Ai (s). (72)
These monopoly distortion constraints imply that the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and nontraded goods is strictly lower than the marginal rate of trans-
formation between these variables.
Now, imagine repeating our analysis for this environment. Clearly, the union-wide
authority can simply levy the appropriate portfolio tax on each Southern country
and achieve the same allocations as when all countries have access to and use their
portfolio taxes to maximize their citizens’ welfare.We summarize this discussion with
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries with Flexible
Exchange Rates) In this economy with restricted policies and flexible exchange rates,
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a union-wide fiscal authority concerned solely with insurance is necessary only to levy
the portfolio taxes that policy-restricted countries are unable to levy.
Clearly, this proposition offers a paternalistic view of the union-wide authority:
Southern countries are unable to carry out desirable policies, so the benevolent union-
wide authority intervenes in their place.
5.3 Policy with self-interested governments
In the environments that we have so far considered, except for international transfers,
the equilibrium does not depend on the tier of decision making at which policies are
set. For example, if instead of allowing national governments to set their country-
specific fiscal policies, we attributed this power to the union-wide authority, then the
same equilibrium would arise. We refer to this property of equilibrium as irrelevance
of delegation of authority. The key assumptions that lead to this result are that the
government of each country maximizes the utility of its citizens and that the union
maximizes a weighted average of the utility of the consumers in each country (along
with the assumption of commitment to policy and that each country is small). Here
we consider self-interested governments, namely, those with objective functions that
differ from those of their citizens, and show how the delegation of authority matters
for the allocations that can be achieved.
We modify our complete market model as follows. Government i chooses the
amount of nontraded goods, Gi (s), to devote to government spending so that the
resource constraints for nontraded goods are now
CiN (s) + Gi (s) ≤ Ai (s)Li (s) for all s. (73)
Consumer preferences are unchanged; in particular, consumers do not value gov-
ernment spending. We model a self-interested government by assuming that the
preferences of the government of country i are given by
∑
s
μ(s)Wi (CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s). (74)
The utility functionWi (·)of the government is sufficiently general so that it can capture
many different types of self-interest. Here we show how equilibrium is affected by the
delegation of portfolio taxes by considering two environments. In both environments,
we assume that the national government of a country sets nontraded goods taxes,
payroll taxes, and domestic transfers, and the union-wide authority sets international
transfers. In the national delegation model, however, the national governments also
set portfolio taxes, whereas in the union delegation model, the union-wide authority
sets these taxes. We study these alternative delegation schemes in a complete market
version of the model.
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5.3.1 National delegation
We start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier logic,
given T cI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i reduces to
max{
CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Wi (CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s),
subject to (73) and
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) ≤
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i,cI ],
where the prices PT = PT (T cI , π−i (T cI )) and Q = Q(T cI , π−i (T cI )) are taken as given
by this government. The first-order conditions for nontraded consumption, labor, and
traded goods can be summarized by
WiN (s) = WiG(s), (75)
−WiL(s) = Ai (s)WiN (s), (76)
μ(s)WiT (s)
μ(s0)WiT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s), (77)
where we have used the normalization that Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1. Evaluating (77) for
country i and country 0 gives that this constraint implies
WiT (s)
WiT (s0)
= W
0
T (s)
W 0T (s0)
. (78)
The extra constraints (75), (76), and (78) should be thought of as self-interested gov-
ernment constraints. That is, the union-wide authority must respect the incentives of
the self-interested national governments to distort allocations away from those that
maximize the utility of their consumers. The union-wide authority’s problem is thus
max{
CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∫
i
λi
[
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s)
]
di, (79)
subject to (73), (75), (76), (78), and
∫
i
CiT (s)di ≤
∫
i
Y iT (s)di.
The constraints in the union-wide authority’s problem capture the union’s inability to
control the policies of noncooperative governments.
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5.3.2 Union delegation
We start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier logic,
given T cI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i reduces to
max{
CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Wi (CiN (s),G
i (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s),
subject to (73),
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) ≤
∑
s
Q(s)PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i,cI ], (80)
and
μ(s)UiT (s)
μ(s0)UiT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s)
1 − τ iD(s)
for all s = s0, (81)
where Q(s)PT (s)/[1 − τ iD(s)] is under the control of the union-wide authority, and
we have used the normalizations Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1 and τ iD(s0) = 0.
Critically, here the union-wide authority can set portfolio taxes in a way that com-
pletely controls the first-order conditions governing traded goods consumption in each
country. The value of the union-wide authority’s problem here is weakly higher than
under the national delegation scheme.
Proposition 5 (Union Delegation of Portfolio Taxes Preferred) In this economy with
self-interested governments, the welfare of the union is higher under the union dele-
gation scheme than under the national delegation scheme.
To prove this result, first note that the problem of a government under national del-
egation is equivalent to one in which we expand the choice set of the government
to include {τ iD(s)} and add the consumer’s first-order condition (81) as a constraint.
Then, observe that in the union delegation problem, the union can always implement
the allocations that arise under national delegation by choosing the same portfolio
taxes as governments choose under national delegation, but can possibly do better.
6 Nontraded goods taxes in practice
As we have shown, when governments have access to nontraded goods taxes, there is
no need to ever levy portfolio taxes under complete markets. Here we argue that, in
practice, governments both have the ability to levy nontraded goods taxes and actually
do so. In this precise sense, our analysis does not provide a strong justification for
instituting a new regime of portfolio taxes within the European Union.
To elaborate, although free-trade agreements in currency areas typically make it
very difficult to differentially tax traded goods, they usually allow some differential
tax treatment of nontraded goods. For example, in May 2009 the Council of the
European Commission adopted a directive (2009/47/EC) that permanently allowed
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the optional use of reduced rates for the value-added tax (VAT) on certain labor-
intensive local services, including restaurant services. The rationale was that for such
nontraded goods, there is no risk of unfair competition between service providers
in different member countries. A document of the European Commission on VAT
rates (European Commission (2016)) further provides evidence of how, in practice,
VAT taxes on nontraded goods (and even some traded goods) vary across member
countries, as is apparent from Fig. 1, which shows, for every member country, the
ratio of reduced tax rates over standard tax rates for a variety of nontraded and traded
goods, based on data from the European Commission. (See European Commission
(2016). Note that Directive 2006/112/EC, which Directive 2009/47/EC expanded to
include labor-intensive services, allows countries to apply either one or two reduced
rates. For countries with two reduced rates, we select the midpoint between these two
rates to compute the ratio of the reduced tax rate over the standard tax rate.)
In addition to this varying VAT for nontraded goods, excise taxes on specific goods
also vary significantly across countries in the European Union. Using beer as a case
study of a specific example of an excise tax, we observe that tax rates on beer indeed
differ across member countries. (See Fig. 2 for the range of actual VAT rates on beer
in 2016 in the European Union.)
7 Conclusion
We have argued that sophisticated financial markets obviate the need for a union-wide
authority to orchestrate fiscal transfers across member countries for insurance reasons.
This result holds true even when national governments are subject to additional con-
straints on their choice of policy because of the paucity of fiscal instruments available
to them. The key idea behind these results is that even with restricted fiscal instruments
and noncooperative governments, no macroeconomic externality arises across coun-
tries. If the goal of a union is to transfer ex-ante wealth from one group of countries to
another, however, then an activist union-wide authority is necessary to carry out such
redistribution.
In terms of the optimal delegation of authority, as long as the objective of the non-
cooperative governments of member countries is to maximize the welfare of their
citizens, we show that an irrelevance of delegation of authority result holds. That is,
the equilibrium is unchanged if any of the labor taxes, nontraded goods taxes, or port-
folio taxes are delegated to the national governments or the union-wide authority. If,
instead, governments pursue self-interested policies, whereas the union-wide author-
ity is benevolent, then it is typically desirable to delegate relatively more policies to
the union-wide authority rather than to national governments.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
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Appendix
Here we provide details behind the derivations in the text.
Setup for Proposition 3A. It is convenient to substitute out traded goods prices and
write the incomplete tax constraints as in (64). The union-wide problem is to solve
max{
CiT (s),L
i (s)
}
∫
i
λi
[
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (Ai (s)Li (s),CiT (s), L
i (s), s)
]
di,
subject to the resource constraints,
∫
i
CiT (s)di ≤
∫
i
Y iT (s)di for all s,
and the incomplete tax constraints,
R0(s)
R0(s0)
− R
i (s)
Ri (s0)
= 0 for all i ∈ S and s = s0,
where μ(s)θ(s) and μ(s)ηi (s) are the normalized multipliers on the resource con-
straints and the incomplete tax constraints. The first-order conditions for CiT (s) for
i ∈ N are
λiU iT (s) = θ(s). (82)
The first-order conditions for Li (s) for i ∈ N are
Ai (s)UiN (s) + UiL(s) = 0. (83)
The first-order conditions for CiT (s) for i ∈ S with i = 0 and s = s0 are
λiU iT (s) + φi (s) = θ(s), (84)
where ηi (s0) = 0 and φi (s) is defined as
φi (s) = −ηi (s)∂R
i (s)/∂CiT (s)
Ri (s0)
. (85)
The first-order condition for CiT (s0) for i ∈ S with i = 0 has the form of (84) with
φi (s0) = −∂
(
1/Ri (s0)
)
∂CiT (s0)
∑
s =s0
μ(s)
μ(s0)
ηi (s)Ri (s). (86)
The first-order conditions for C0T (s) and s = s0 have the form of (84) with
φ0(s) = 1
R0(s0)
∂R0(s)
∂C0T (s)
∫
j∈S
η j (s)d j, (87)
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whereas the first-order condition for C0T (s0) has the form of (84) with
φ0(s0) = ∂
(
1/R0(s0)
)
∂C0T (s0)
∑
s =s0
[
μ(s)
μ(s0)
R0(s)
∫
j∈S
η j (s)d j
]
, (88)
where η0(s) = 0 for all s. Let Hi (s) ≡ λi [Ai (s)UiN (s) + UiL(s)] be the Pareto-
weighted value of the net marginal utility of supplying one more unit of time as labor
in the nontraded goods sector. The first-order condition for Li (s) for i ∈ S with i = 0
and s = s0 is
Hi (s) = ηi (s)∂R
i (s)/∂Li (s)
Ri (s0)
, (89)
so that solving for ηi (s) for i = 0 and s = s0 gives
ηi (s) = H
i (s)Ri (s0)
∂Ri (s)/∂Li (s)
. (90)
Substituting for ηi (s) into the various expressions for φi (s) allows us to express φi (s)
directly in terms of allocations. For example, substituting (90) into (85), and using the
definition of Hi (s), gives
φm(s) = −λm[Am(s)UmN (s) + UmL (s)]
∂Rm(s)/∂CmT (s)
∂Rm(s)/∂Lm(s)
,
which is expression (67) in the text.
To show how the first-order conditions for risk sharing can be decentralized, con-
sider the competitive equilibrium. The consumer’s problem is
max{
CiN (s),C
i
T (s),L
i (s),Di (s)
}
∑
s
μ(s)Ui (CiN (s),C
i
T (s), L
i (s), s)
subject to ∑
s
Q(s)Di (s) ≤ 0,
and a budget constraint for each state s,
[1 + τ iN (s)]PiNCiN (s) + PT (s)CiT (s) ≤ Wi (s)Li (s)
+PT (s)[Y iT (s) + T i (s) + T iI (s)] + i (s) + [1 − τ iD(s)]Di (s).
Lettingρi be themultiplier on the assetmarket constraint andμ(s)αi (s) be the normal-
ized multiplier on the budget constraint, the first-order conditions for CiT (s), D
i (s),
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Li (s), and CiN (s) are
UiT (s) = αi (s)PT (s),
ρi Q(s) = αi (s)μ(s)[1 − τ iD(s)],
−UiL(s) = αi (s)Wi (s),
UiN (s) = αi (s)[1 + τ iN (s)]PiN .
We can manipulate these conditions to obtain
UiT (s)[1 − τ iD(s)]
ρi
= U
j
T (s)[1 − τ jD(s)]
ρ j
.
Suppose that we are given the allocations from the union-wide problem with weights
λi and multipliers φi (s). If we set λi = 1/ρi and
τ iD(s) = −
ρiφi (s)
UiT (s)
for i ∈ S and τ iD(s) = 0 for i ∈ N ,
then the risk-sharing first-order conditions in the union-wide problem and the com-
petitive equilibrium coincide. unionsq
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